The Usage of a Theory of Reference as a Proto-Science

 

 

1. Introduction : Problems in the theory of reference

 

   Before Kripke's new suggestion, the descriptive theory of reference has been dominated in philosophy, specifically in analytic philosophy. Nowadays almost all philosophers adopt Kripke's new theory, so-called the causal-historical theory of reference. Then what do philosophers think about the abandoned descriptive theory of reference? Do they think it is a wrong or a bad theory? Isn't there any use of the descriptive theory in any theoretical part in our whole knowledge? Then, what do we exactly mean when we say "Kripke's theory is a better one"? Does Kripke's theory do better only in analytic epistemology or in the whole parts of epistemology?

 

    For working specialists in another disciplines(physics, chemistry, psychology,...etc), they think that the terms or the meanings of terms in philosophy are very difficult to treat to. Because philosophical terms have so general meaning and philosophical consequences are toward so general(universal) conclusions. But If we ask them what do they think of a theory, specially a theory of reference, they will clearly say : "The theory which we use in our own discipline? Of course it is a very good tool for explaining and interpreting some phenomena. We don't say about its truth, because saying its truth is meaningless. We say it a plausible or a useful theory. Its usefulness can be proved by many specific ways."

 

   But are there some special properties in the terms or statements of philosophy? Some philosopher would say that "Philosophy must clarify what a genuine theory of reference is. Philosophers have to provide rational grounds to a theory of reference." Then we can ask, "What do you mean when you use ｅxpressions as 'genuine' or 'rational grounds'? Do psychologists or economists use your philosophical consequences in their work?" In our time there are so many subjects in field of knowledge. So, even if we philosophers have an universal theory of reference, we must specify meaning and limitation in using this theory to each specific subjects. It is true that philosopher do a different thing contrast to another experts, but his work can not be separated with contents of another subjects.

 

   In that sense, we can also ask the truth of a reference theory in a specific field. If it has been proven to have some significant problems because of the results done by experimental philosophers(Stephen Stich, Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, etc), what does it exactly mean? If experimental philosophers attack a theory of reference which is used for a specific purpose, then we don't have to give up the whole usage of the theory. What is the problem with a theory of reference? For what purposes do we use a theory of reference and how we can estimate its usefulness or its truthness? If we do not pay an attention to specific features of problems related to a theory of reference, we can go to some radical conclusions without believable alternatives.

 

2. Devitt : Usage of a theory of reference as a Proto-Science

 

   Probably we almost agree with the fact that a theory of reference has taken an important role in various parts of philosophy. Stich thinks it is very dangerous to assert to existence (or non-existence) of something based on a specific kind of theory of reference. Because if we each other has different intuitions about reference, we can not decide which theory of reference is true. The concept 'ubiquity of variation' seems essential to Stich's argument. We can not exactly decide a theory for there are always some uncontrollabe factors which corrupt lucide decide among several reference theories. As to Stich, we must abandon all kinds of arguments from reference.

 

   I can agree that it is too strong to assert existence or non-existence from argument based on some kind of reference theory. But it is difficult to ignore practical values of theory of reference in many different branches of knowledge. From historical respect, the descriptive theory of reference was invented by Gottlob Frege and it was very powerful in formalizing mathematical statements and mathematical reasoning. It is another thing to conjecture the probability of universal applicability of descriptive theory to natural language. If we focus at specific subject like mathematics, there are many satisfactory reasons to use descriptive theory of referece in mathematics.

 

   Then, what about other areas? If you search basic economics textbook, it says that rational behavior 'act' consists of two major parts. one is 'desire' and the other is 'belief'. Moreover, it says that act's desire(or intention) is equal to 'utility function' and act's belief equals to 'probability function'. Of course these definitions are based on some kind of descriptive reference theory and if we are not economists, we don't exactly know why this kind of definitions are adduced in economics. But if these definitions are sound (for many practical reasons) and if this kind of economics works well in explaining economic phenomena, what is the problem for using them? Economists do not think that act's desire can be perfectly mapped by utility function and for them it is only an useful (plausible) abstraction.

 

   In many other branches(physics, psychology, biology, etc), there are so many uses of theory of reference as operative hypotheses. May be we can classify each theory of reference in two major category : Is this definition based on a descriptive theory or a causal-historical theory? But is it so important to classify them? Isn't it more important to ask why is this definition useful and in what respect is this defintion makes some kinds of problems? Using Devitt's phrases, "..the task of a theory of reference is to characterize some word-world mapping that is scientifically useful... the task is to characterize reference in particular, not just some word-world relation."

 

3. Devitt versus Stich : Applicability and limitations of using a theory of reference

 

   Then, what makes Stich to be against arguments from a theory of reference? Why does he think Devitt's proto-science program is ignoring or missing something? In my opinion, he still makes questions about pattern and usage of theory of reference even in specific areas. Einstein once said that scientific concepts are also some kinds of "refined ordinary concepts." If we accept Einstein's view, even scientific concepts are based on ordinary concepts so their validity or truth is also depend on ordinary concepts' validity or truth. Then, in what sense can we evaluate this or that scientific definition 'useful' or 'believable'? Even if we are scientists or mathematicians, don't we always use our intuitions to judge our definitions? And if our definitions are based on some kind of reference theory, and also if people's intuitions to reference are different from culture to culture, isn't it a serious problem for proto-science program?

 

   Now we can ask (1) how much do actors' (who engages in specific sciences) intuitions affect in deciding (or verdicting, examining) a concept(reflecting some kind of reference theory) in practice of specific sciences? and (2) how much do actor's intuitions affect in formulating (or conjecturing) a concept in practice of specific sciences? Finally, (3) how do actors accept or reject a concept in specific sciences and are there any severe 'ubiquity of variation' in those areas? I don't think I can give universal answers to each questions, and I don't think I have to do that. But if we regard to first question, we can think about history of astronomy. Copernicus' heliocentric concept of universe was very strange to most ordinary people(in that sense, it was contrary to people's intuition), but his astronomical system was accepted in science society and now almost everybody accepts heliocentric system. Did that transformation of intuition come from people's intuition? No! At least in this case, physics itself, experts in physics and activities of science society influenced to people's intuition critically. So we can answer to first question passively : there is at least one specific science which its concepts do not be affected only by people's ordinary intuition.

 

   Now we move to second and third question. A lot of new theoretical conjectures in specific sciences usually include several fresh concepts. And those concepts are strange and even a little exotic to people even to experts in that area. So we can hardly say that the inventor's intuition was ordinary and it is not obvious whether he (or she) did make such new concepts only from his (or her) intuitions. Then, what makes those kind of concepts accepted to people? There can be many explanations about it, but it is clear that there are not so many problematic features in evaluating and deciding concepts in specific sciences. Even if there are some controversial concepts, there seems to be specific mechanisms peculiar to the science.

 

   Then what can a theory of reference do in practice of science? If it functions only as a secondary tool in sciences, and if experts in those sciences choose concepts only in regarding to their own specific interests, what can philosophers do with theory of reference? Is it worth to study a theory of reference philosophically? If there are some values in studying theories of reference, what are they and how do philosophers have to practice it with another experts in that specific science? These are very difficult questions to answer to. But to find proper rules of theory of reference and to find proper roles of philosopher in theoretical investigation of reference theory can not be impossible. And I think it is much better way than to abandon all practical values of theory of reference.

 

4. Conclusion : Practical usage of theory of reference as a Proto-Science

 

   Even if the theories of reference only function as a secondary role in sciences, there are so many important concepts whose shape is depend on a particular reference theory. And finding basic types of reference theory and justfying their own functional values are tasks belong to philosophers. Philosopher (well known as a logical empiricist) Hans Reichenbach once said that the task of scientific philosophy is analyzing scientific statements. But it is not an easy and a typical task. Brilliant and influent results can be arise from philosophical analyzing and generalizing. If philosophers can give basic forms of reference and if they can give an important criteria in using reference to an particular science, it is worth to study reference theory for both philosophers and experts in a science.

 

   Someone would ask me : "Can you give me a piece of hint to notice the importance of philosophical work with theory of reference?" As I said before, Frege's theory of reference(in his「On sense and reference」) did very important role in mathematical logic and formalization of mathematics. In economics, there are many important definitions formed by using Fregean theory of reference. And also we all know about operationalism (advocated by Bridgeman) in physics. Operationalism has many historic-philosophical backgrounds. Heinrich Helmholtz, Ernst Mach, Henri Poincaré all emphasized physiological analysis of human perception and they thought all exact physical meanings must be defined by clear operational processes. This empirical tendency strongly influenced Logical Empiricism and all we know its undeniable impact on history of knowledge.

 

   It is obvious that philosophers should go to another science's area and find out what is wrong and what is deficient in their concepts and definitions. Philosophers should not stay in their arm-chairs. But his method(concept analysis) can be maintained in conjecturing new definitions of specific concepts and analyzing some concepts' meaning. Even if we know our definitions(using a theory of reference) are temporal, we can use them and get important advances from them. Then what aims and methods should we assign to theory of reference for each specific sciences? We can not give an universal answer to this question, but we actually can start analyzing concepts and maybe we can find some good answer to particular specified questions.

 

 

 

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